The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the
private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this
paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of
the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and
the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the
institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We
show that since ...
The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the
private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this
paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of
the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and
the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the
institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We
show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science
sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the
brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the
market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby
worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary
and non-monetary incentives in science.
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