Money, fame and the allocation of talent: Brain drain and the institution of science

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• dc.contributor.author Jeon, Doh-Shinca
• dc.contributor.author Menicucci, Domenicoca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:39Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:39Z
• dc.date.issued 2005-02-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:08:59Z
• dc.description.abstract The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=805
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/717
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 805
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword fame
• dc.subject.keyword science
• dc.subject.keyword brain drain
• dc.subject.keyword incentives
• dc.subject.keyword asymmetric information
• dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
• dc.title Money, fame and the allocation of talent: Brain drain and the institution of scienceca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper