This paper argues that ideas about tax matter as much as interests and institutions for understanding social attitudes and responses to attempts by the state to raise revenues for development agendas. Tax is a profoundly political problem, reflecting different and sometimes opposing ideas about the role of the state, the market and business–state relationships, and tax rises in developing countries can become linked to wider conflicts of development. Using the case of Argentina, the paper examines, ...
This paper argues that ideas about tax matter as much as interests and institutions for understanding social attitudes and responses to attempts by the state to raise revenues for development agendas. Tax is a profoundly political problem, reflecting different and sometimes opposing ideas about the role of the state, the market and business–state relationships, and tax rises in developing countries can become linked to wider conflicts of development. Using the case of Argentina, the paper examines, empirically, the attempts by the government of Cristina Kirchner to finance state expenditure and social welfare via raising taxes on commodity exports after 2008. It argues that ideas of tax became embedded with deeply contested ideas of what the state’s role in development should be.
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