Mostra el registre parcial de l'element Llavador, Humberto
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa 2017-07-26T10:50:37Z 2017-07-26T10:50:37Z 2005-10-01
dc.identifier.citation Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 56(3):355-365, 2008
dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative. The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 900
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.title Voting with preferences over margins of victory
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper 2017-07-23T02:09:59Z
dc.subject.keyword margin of victory
dc.subject.keyword plurality
dc.subject.keyword abstention
dc.subject.keyword strategic voting
dc.subject.keyword committee voting
dc.subject.keyword elections
dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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