Voting with preferences over margins of victory
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- dc.contributor.author Llavador, Humbertoca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:37Z
- dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:37Z
- dc.date.issued 2005-10-01
- dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:09:59Z
- dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative. The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=900
- dc.identifier.citation Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 56(3):355-365, 2008
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/601
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 900
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword margin of victory
- dc.subject.keyword plurality
- dc.subject.keyword abstention
- dc.subject.keyword strategic voting
- dc.subject.keyword committee voting
- dc.subject.keyword elections
- dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
- dc.title Voting with preferences over margins of victoryca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper