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Are regulatory agencies independent in practice? Evidence from board members in Spain

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dc.contributor.author Fernández i Marín, Xavier
dc.contributor.author Jordana, Jacint
dc.contributor.author Bianculli, Andrea C.
dc.date.accessioned 2021-03-02T08:44:08Z
dc.date.available 2021-03-02T08:44:08Z
dc.date.issued 2016
dc.identifier.citation Fernández X, Jordana J, Bianculli AC. Are regulatory agencies independent in practice? Evidence from board members in Spain. Regulation & Governance. 2016 Sep;10(3):230-47. DOI: 10.1111/rego.12084
dc.identifier.issn 1748-5991
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/46636
dc.description Includes supplemental online material: appendix
dc.description.abstract Are the board members of regulatory agencies (regulators), taken as a particular cluster within the public sphere, independent of elected politicians and tenured bureaucrats? How can we assess their independence in practice, beyond formal rules? To address these questions, this paper delves into two key dimensions: board members' social connections and their security of tenure in office. Firstly, we focus on regulators' identity as policy adjudicators and examine their political and administrative relations. In doing so, we expect to understand better how regulators' social and political situations may influence their behavior. Secondly, we assess their political vulnerability through political cycles in order to measure their de facto independence over time. Additionally, variations in these two dimensions are compared with respect to the effect of different de jure appointment rules. We contrast these expectations with the empirical evaluation of board members of regulatory agencies in Spain (1979–2010). Thus, we confirm that regulators who have an administrative profile are more vulnerable to political changes than those with political ties, while appointment rules have an influence on their political vulnerability.
dc.description.sponsorship This study was funded by a research grant of the Escola d’Administració Pública de Catalunya (GAP/2944/2010). Support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (CSO2009/11053) is acknowledged.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Wiley
dc.relation.ispartof Regulation & Governance. 2016 Sep;10(3):230-47
dc.rights This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Fernández X, Jordana J, Bianculli AC. Are regulatory agencies independent in practice? Evidence from board members in Spain. Regulation and Governance. 2016 Sep;10(3):230-47. DOI: 10.1111/rego.12084, which has been published in final form at http://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12084. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
dc.title Are regulatory agencies independent in practice? Evidence from board members in Spain
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.identifier.doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rego.12084
dc.subject.keyword Regulatory agencies
dc.subject.keyword Regulatory governance
dc.subject.keyword Agency boards
dc.subject.keyword Independence
dc.subject.keyword Regulators' turnover
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/CSO2009-11053
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion

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