dc.contributor.author |
Maddaloni, Angela |
dc.contributor.author |
Peydró, José-Luis |
dc.date.accessioned |
2020-09-02T11:02:12Z |
dc.date.available |
2020-09-02T11:02:12Z |
dc.date.issued |
2010-10 |
dc.identifier.issn |
1725-2806 (online) |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/45248 |
dc.description.abstract |
Using a unique dataset of the Euro area and the U.S. bank lending standards, we find that low (monetary policy) short-term interest rates soften standards, for household and corporate loans. This softening – especially for mortgages – is amplified by securitization activity, weak supervision for bank capital and too low for too long monetary policy rates. Conversely, low long-term interest rates do not soften lending standards. Finally, countries with softer lending standards before the crisis related to negative Taylor-rule residuals experienced a worse economic performance afterwards. These results help shed light on the origins of the crisis and have important policy implications. |
dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Working Papers Series (European Central Bank);1248 (October 2010) |
dc.rights |
© Tots els drets reservats |
dc.subject.other |
Lending standards |
dc.subject.other |
Monetary policy |
dc.subject.other |
Securitization |
dc.subject.other |
Bank capital |
dc.subject.other |
Financial stability |
dc.title |
Bank risk-taking, securitization, supervision, and low interest rates: evidence from the Euro-area and the U.S. lending standards |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.rights.accessRights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |