Bank risk-taking, securitization, supervision, and low interest rates: evidence from the Euro-area and the U.S. lending standards
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- dc.contributor.author Maddaloni, Angela
- dc.contributor.author Peydró, José-Luis
- dc.date.accessioned 2020-09-02T11:02:12Z
- dc.date.available 2020-09-02T11:02:12Z
- dc.date.issued 2010-10
- dc.description.abstract Using a unique dataset of the Euro area and the U.S. bank lending standards, we find that low (monetary policy) short-term interest rates soften standards, for household and corporate loans. This softening – especially for mortgages – is amplified by securitization activity, weak supervision for bank capital and too low for too long monetary policy rates. Conversely, low long-term interest rates do not soften lending standards. Finally, countries with softer lending standards before the crisis related to negative Taylor-rule residuals experienced a worse economic performance afterwards. These results help shed light on the origins of the crisis and have important policy implications.ca
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
- dc.identifier.issn 1725-2806
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/45248
- dc.language.iso engca
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Papers Series (European Central Bank);1248 (October 2010)
- dc.rights © Tots els drets reservatsca
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
- dc.subject.other Lending standardsca
- dc.subject.other Monetary policyca
- dc.subject.other Securitizationca
- dc.subject.other Bank capitalca
- dc.subject.other Financial stabilityca
- dc.title Bank risk-taking, securitization, supervision, and low interest rates: evidence from the Euro-area and the U.S. lending standardsca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca