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dc.contributor.author Sandiumenge Boy, Màxim
dc.date.accessioned 2019-07-03T11:34:34Z
dc.date.available 2019-07-03T11:34:34Z
dc.date.issued 2019
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/41924
dc.description Treball de Fi de Grau en Economia. Curs 2018-2019
dc.description.abstract Rules of thumb, deviations from the standard objective functions, or explicit cognitive bounds have been introduced in Industrial Organization to tackle irrationality. At the same time, a considerable literature has been extending level-k since Nagel (1995), but little has been done on its application outside experimental settings. To address this we define a model of boundedly rationality and we apply it to a Cournot competition game, finding that the accuracy of anticipation and the distribution of level 0 players’ action play a critical role in explaining which firms become larger in dynamic settings.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Treball de fi de grau – Curs 2018-2019
dc.subject.other Cournot, A. A. (Antoine Augustin), 1801-1877
dc.subject.other Anticipacions racionals (Teoria econòmica)
dc.subject.other Macroeconomia
dc.subject.other Competència econòmica|
dc.title Competition à la Cournot with bounded rationality
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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