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All's well that ends well? Crisis policy after the German Constitutional Court's ruling in Gauweiler

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dc.contributor.author Steinbach, Armin
dc.date.accessioned 2018-09-19T12:13:07Z
dc.date.available 2018-09-19T12:13:07Z
dc.date.issued 2018-04
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/35469
dc.description.abstract Crisis policy of the ECB has been controversial on the judicial stage between the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the German Constitutional Court (FCC). While the controversy appears to be settled at this stage following the FCC's judgment in June 2016, disagreement between the courts persists in two regards. First, on the scope and intensity of judicial review of a potential future application of the OMT programme, the FCC gives less discretionary leeway to the ECB than the CJEU and thus exerts stricter judicial review. Second, there are legal boundaries on a “haircut” relinquishing parts of the debt of euro countries owed to Member States and the ECB. This article offers a legal analysis of the remaining controversies and the policy scope of the ECB.
dc.description.sponsorship The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries ADEMU Working Paper Series;102
dc.rights This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium provided that the original work is properlyattributed.
dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject.other European Central Bank
dc.subject.other OMT
dc.subject.other Judicial review
dc.subject.other Haircut
dc.title All's well that ends well? Crisis policy after the German Constitutional Court's ruling in Gauweiler
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/649396
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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