Show simple item record Levine, David K. Mattozzi, Andrea 2016-09-15T13:07:33Z 2016-09-15T13:07:33Z 2016-04
dc.description.abstract We re-examine the theory of rational voter participation where voting is by two collusive parties enforcing social norms through costly peer punishment. The model nests both the ethical voter model and the pivotal voter model. In the unique mixed strategy equilibrium the advantaged party gets all surplus. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low and the benefit of winning/nthe election is the same for both parties, the larger party is always advantaged. When instead the enforcement of social norms is costly we have a result reminiscent of Olson, and the smaller party may be advantaged.
dc.description.sponsorship The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries ADEMU Working Paper Series;21
dc.rights This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium provided that the original work is properlyattributed.
dc.title Voter participation with collusive parties
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.subject.keyword Voting
dc.subject.keyword Collusion
dc.subject.keyword Organization
dc.subject.keyword Party
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/H2020/649396
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess


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