This paper claims that relational position and group-based distinctions are less important in determining the rights of animals than Zoopolis concludes. In particular, it argues that the theory of animal rights developed in Zoopolis is vulnerable to some of the critiques that are made against theories which differentiate the rights of humans on the basis of group-based distinctions. For example, in the human context, group-differentiated theories of rights have been criticised on a number of important ...
This paper claims that relational position and group-based distinctions are less important in determining the rights of animals than Zoopolis concludes. In particular, it argues that the theory of animal rights developed in Zoopolis is vulnerable to some of the critiques that are made against theories which differentiate the rights of humans on the basis of group-based distinctions. For example, in the human context, group-differentiated theories of rights have been criticised on a number of important grounds: for failing to extend to non-associates rights that ought to be so extended; for granting too much weight to the rights of associates over non-associates; for wrongly treating groups as homogenous entities; and for also assuming that these groups necessarily have value as they exist presently. This paper outlines how modified versions of these critiques can be levelled at the theory of animal rights defended in Zoopolis.
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