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A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation

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dc.contributor.author Serrano, Roberto
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T12:07:54Z
dc.date.available 2017-07-26T12:07:54Z
dc.date.issued 1996-03-01
dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=161
dc.identifier.citation Economics Letters, 55, 203-208, 1997
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/20815
dc.description.abstract The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are made compatible with the framework of the theory of implementation. This is done through a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibility problems, thereby allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the payoff space. In this framework, we show that the core is the only major cooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of most cooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept (like most papers in the Nash program do). Finally, the mechanisms in the Nash program are adapted into the model.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 161
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:02:29Z
dc.subject.keyword nash program
dc.subject.keyword implementation
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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