A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation

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• dc.contributor.author Serrano, Robertoca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T12:07:54Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T12:07:54Z
• dc.date.issued 1996-03-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:02:29Z
• dc.description.abstract The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are made compatible with the framework of the theory of implementation. This is done through a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibility problems, thereby allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the payoff space. In this framework, we show that the core is the only major cooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of most cooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept (like most papers in the Nash program do). Finally, the mechanisms in the Nash program are adapted into the model.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=161
• dc.identifier.citation Economics Letters, 55, 203-208, 1997
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/20815
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 161
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword nash program
• dc.subject.keyword implementation
• dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
• dc.title A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementationca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper