The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are made
compatible with the framework of the theory of implementation. This is done
through a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibility
problems, thereby allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the
payoff space. In this framework, we show that the core is the only major
cooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of most
cooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the Nash ...
The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are made
compatible with the framework of the theory of implementation. This is done
through a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibility
problems, thereby allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the
payoff space. In this framework, we show that the core is the only major
cooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of most
cooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
(like most papers in the Nash program do). Finally, the mechanisms in the
Nash program are adapted into the model.
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