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Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

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dc.contributor.author Apesteguía, José
dc.contributor.author Ballester, Miguel A.
dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:43:13Z
dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:43:13Z
dc.date.issued 2011-09-01
dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1280
dc.identifier.citation Economics Letters, 115(2): 172-174, May 2012
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/19875
dc.description.abstract Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature: Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfare implications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategic sophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2011) have shown that the chances of naive participants getting into a good school are higher under the Boston mechanism than under DA, and some naive participants are actually better off. In this note we show that these results can be extended to show that, under the veil of ignorance, i.e. students not yet knowing their utility values, all naive students may prefer to adopt the Boston mechanism.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1280
dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.title Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:13:57Z
dc.subject.keyword school choice; naive players; welfare; veil of ignorance
dc.subject.keyword Behavioral and Experimental Economics
dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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