Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

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• dc.contributor.author Apesteguía, Joséca
• dc.contributor.author Ballester, Miguel A.ca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:43:13Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:43:13Z
• dc.date.issued 2011-09-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:13:57Z
• dc.description.abstract Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature: Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfare implications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategic sophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2011) have shown that the chances of naive participants getting into a good school are higher under the Boston mechanism than under DA, and some naive participants are actually better off. In this note we show that these results can be extended to show that, under the veil of ignorance, i.e. students not yet knowing their utility values, all naive students may prefer to adopt the Boston mechanism.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1280
• dc.identifier.citation Economics Letters, 115(2): 172-174, May 2012
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/19875
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1280
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword school choice; naive players; welfare; veil of ignorance
• dc.subject.keyword Behavioral and Experimental Economics
• dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
• dc.title Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choiceca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper