How is it possible to square the development of a consistent European/napproach to religious diversity with the recognition of the sometimes-conflictive/nplurality of state-religion models? The Court´s support of the liberal/nprinciples of separation and neutrality have either been deplored by Christian/nconservatives as the result of European Christophobia, or celebrated/nby secularists as contributing to the formation of a Europe free of religion./nIn contrast, the present chapter argues for a ...
How is it possible to square the development of a consistent European/napproach to religious diversity with the recognition of the sometimes-conflictive/nplurality of state-religion models? The Court´s support of the liberal/nprinciples of separation and neutrality have either been deplored by Christian/nconservatives as the result of European Christophobia, or celebrated/nby secularists as contributing to the formation of a Europe free of religion./nIn contrast, the present chapter argues for a differentiated approach to/nEuropean jurisprudence, outlining how the Court has been oscillating between/nan appealing liberal-pluralist perspective or framework, and a questionable/nmajoritarian one. Both perspectives are illustrated by focusing on/nrepresentative decisions in the area of religious education and symbols.
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