Mostra el registre parcial de l'element
dc.contributor.author | Arruñada, Benito |
dc.contributor.other | Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-05-25T09:27:10Z |
dc.date.available | 2020-05-25T09:27:10Z |
dc.date.issued | 2000-01-01 |
dc.identifier | https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=445 |
dc.identifier.citation | Revue d'Economie Industrielle, 92, 2nd and 3rd trimesters, (2000), pp. 277-96. Reprinted in E. Brousseau and J.-M. Glachant (eds.), The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 337-57 |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1142 |
dc.description.abstract | The paper explores an efficiency hypothesis regarding the contractual process between large retailers, such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, and their suppliers. The empirical evidence presented supports the idea that large retailers play a quasi-judicial role, acting as "courts of first instance" in their relationships with suppliers. In this role, large retailers adjust the terms of trade to on-going changes and sanction performance failures, sometimes delaying payments. A potential abuse of their position is limited by the need for re-contracting and preserving their reputations. Suppliers renew their confidence in their retailers on a yearly basis, through writing new contracts. This renovation contradicts the alternative hypothesis that suppliers are expropriated by large retailers as a consequence of specific investments. |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf |
dc.language.iso | eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 445 |
dc.rights | L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.title | The quasi-judicial role of large retailers: An efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.date.modified | 2020-05-25T09:18:26Z |
dc.subject.keyword | retailing |
dc.subject.keyword | distribution |
dc.subject.keyword | contracts |
dc.subject.keyword | transaction costs |
dc.subject.keyword | self-enforcement |
dc.subject.keyword | Business Economics and Industrial Organization |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |