The quasi-judicial role of large retailers: An efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers
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- dc.contributor.author Arruñada, Benito
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2020-05-25T09:27:10Z
- dc.date.available 2020-05-25T09:27:10Z
- dc.date.issued 2000-01-01
- dc.date.modified 2020-05-25T09:18:26Z
- dc.description.abstract The paper explores an efficiency hypothesis regarding the contractual process between large retailers, such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, and their suppliers. The empirical evidence presented supports the idea that large retailers play a quasi-judicial role, acting as "courts of first instance" in their relationships with suppliers. In this role, large retailers adjust the terms of trade to on-going changes and sanction performance failures, sometimes delaying payments. A potential abuse of their position is limited by the need for re-contracting and preserving their reputations. Suppliers renew their confidence in their retailers on a yearly basis, through writing new contracts. This renovation contradicts the alternative hypothesis that suppliers are expropriated by large retailers as a consequence of specific investments.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=445
- dc.identifier.citation Revue d'Economie Industrielle, 92, 2nd and 3rd trimesters, (2000), pp. 277-96. Reprinted in E. Brousseau and J.-M. Glachant (eds.), The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 337-57
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1142
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 445
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword retailing
- dc.subject.keyword distribution
- dc.subject.keyword contracts
- dc.subject.keyword transaction costs
- dc.subject.keyword self-enforcement
- dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organization
- dc.title The quasi-judicial role of large retailers: An efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper