Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets: Theories of harm for abuse cases

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  • dc.contributor.author Motta, Massimo
  • dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
  • dc.date.accessioned 2024-11-14T10:09:40Z
  • dc.date.available 2024-11-14T10:09:40Z
  • dc.date.issued 2022-12-01
  • dc.date.modified 2024-11-14T10:08:46Z
  • dc.description.abstract Antitrust agencies all over the world have been investigating large digital platforms for practices which may constitute an abuse of dominance. Here I discuss practices (including "selfpreferencing" and denial or degradation of interoperability) which can be interpreted as foreclosure in vertically-related or complementary markets. I discuss in particular a few high-profile cases involving Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google. I focus on possible theories of harm for such cases and show that both original simple models and well-established economic theories (adapted or interpreted) provide a rationale for anti-competitive foreclosure.
  • dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
  • dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1851
  • dc.identifier.citation
  • dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/68578
  • dc.language.iso eng
  • dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1851
  • dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
  • dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
  • dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
  • dc.subject.keyword self-preferencing
  • dc.subject.keyword abuse of dominance
  • dc.subject.keyword monopolization
  • dc.subject.keyword exclusionary practices
  • dc.subject.keyword digital platforms
  • dc.subject.keyword two-sided markets
  • dc.subject.keyword vertical foreclosure
  • dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
  • dc.title Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets: Theories of harm for abuse cases
  • dc.title.alternative
  • dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper