An experiment on Nash implementation
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- dc.contributor.author Cabrales, Antonioca
- dc.contributor.author Charness, Garyca
- dc.contributor.author Corchón, Luisca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T12:07:57Z
- dc.date.available 2017-07-26T12:07:57Z
- dc.date.issued 1998-06-01
- dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:06:45Z
- dc.description.abstract We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism succesfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and an imbedded comprehension test indicates that subjects were generally able to comprehend their decision tasks. The performance can also be improved by imposing a fine on non designated dissidents. We offer some explanations for the imperfect implementation, including risk preferences, the possibilities that agents have for collusion, and the mixed strategy equilibria of the game.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=300
- dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 51, (2003), pp. 161-193,
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1229
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 300
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword implementation
- dc.subject.keyword experiments
- dc.subject.keyword mechanisms
- dc.subject.keyword leex
- dc.subject.keyword Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- dc.title An experiment on Nash implementationca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper