How effective are monetary incentives to vote? Evidence from a nationwide policy

Mariella, Gonzales; León-Ciliotta, Gianmarco; Martinez, Luis R.

How effective are monetary incentives to vote? Evidence from a nationwide policy

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Citació

Mariella, G, León-Ciliotta, G, Martinez, L. How effective are monetary incentives to vote? Evidence from a nationwide policy. 2018. handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44697

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Resum

We combine two natural experiments, multiple empirical strategies and administrative data to study voters' response to marginal changes to the fine for electoral abstention in Peru. A smaller fine leads to a robust decrease in voter turnout. However, the drop in turnout caused by a full ne reduction is less than 20% the size of that caused by an exemption from compulsory voting, indicating the predominance of the non-monetary incentives provided by the mandate to vote. Additionally, almost 90% of the votes generated by a marginally larger ne are blank or invalid, lending support to the hypothesis of rational abstention. Higher demand for information and larger long-run effects following an adjustment to the value of the ne point to the existence of informational frictions that limit adaptation to institutional changes.