Managerial incentives for mergers

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• dc.contributor.author Faulí, Ramonca
• dc.contributor.author Motta, Massimoca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T12:08:00Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T12:08:00Z
• dc.date.issued 1995-11-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:02:15Z
• dc.description.abstract We study managerial incentives in a model where managers take not only product market but also takeover decisions. We show that the optimal contract includes an incentive to increase the firm's sales, under both quantity and price competition. This result is in contrast to the previous literature and hinges on the fact that with a more aggressive manager rival firms earn lower profits and are willing to sell out at a lower price. \\ However, as a side--effect of such a contract, the manager might take over more rivals than would be profitable.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=148
• dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 4, 4, (1996), pp. 497-514
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/20725
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 148
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword Finance and Accounting
• dc.title Managerial incentives for mergersca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper