Concentration and self-censorship in commercial media

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  • dc.contributor.author Germano, Fabrizio
  • dc.contributor.author Meier, Martin
  • dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
  • dc.date.accessioned 2020-05-25T09:26:44Z
  • dc.date.available 2020-05-25T09:26:44Z
  • dc.date.issued 2010-12-01
  • dc.date.modified 2020-05-25T09:23:09Z
  • dc.description.abstract Within a simple model of non-localized, Hotelling-type competition among arbitrary numbers of media outlets we characterize quality and content of media under different ownership structures. Assuming advertising-sponsored, profit-maximizing outlets, we show that (i) topics sensitive to advertisers can be underreported (self-censored) by all outlets in the market, (ii) self-censorship increases with the concentration of ownership, (iii) adding outlets, while keeping the number of owners fixed, may even increase self-censorship; the latter result relies on consumers' most preferred outlets being potentially owned by the same media companies. We argue that externalities resulting from self-censorship could be empirically large.
  • dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
  • dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1256
  • dc.identifier.citation Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 97, pp. 117-130, 2013
  • dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/11728
  • dc.language.iso eng
  • dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1256
  • dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
  • dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
  • dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
  • dc.subject.keyword media economics; media consolidation; media markets; advertising and commercial media bias.
  • dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
  • dc.title Concentration and self-censorship in commercial media
  • dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper