The role of role uncertainty in modified dictator games

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• dc.contributor.author Iriberri, Nagoreca
• dc.contributor.author Rey-Biel, Pedroca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T12:08:01Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T12:08:01Z
• dc.date.issued 2008-05-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:12:27Z
• dc.description.abstract We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjects choose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and a costly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are the most frequent under role uncertainty (64%), selfish actions become the most frequent without role uncertainty (69%). Also, the frequency of surplus destroying choices is negligible with role uncertainty (1%) but not so without it (11%). A classification of subjects into four different types of interdependent preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse and Competitive) shows that the use of role uncertainty overestimates the prevalence of Social Welfare maximizing preferences in the subject population (from 74% with role uncertainty to 21% without it) and underestimates Selfish and Inequity Averse preferences. An additional treatment, in which subjects undertake an understanding test before participating in the experiment with role uncertainty, shows that the vast majority of subjects (93%) correctly understand the payoff mechanism with role uncertainty, but yet surplus creating actions were most frequent. Our results warn against the use of role uncertainty in experiments that aim to measure the prevalence of interdependent preferences.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1147
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/4578
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1147
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword role uncertainty
• dc.subject.keyword role reversal
• dc.subject.keyword interdependent preferences
• dc.subject.keyword social welfare
• dc.subject.keyword maximizing
• dc.subject.keyword inequity aversion
• dc.subject.keyword mixture-of-types models
• dc.subject.keyword strategy method
• dc.subject.keyword experiments.
• dc.subject.keyword leex
• dc.subject.keyword Behavioral and Experimental Economics
• dc.title The role of role uncertainty in modified dictator gamesca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper