Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

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• dc.contributor.author Garoupa, Nunoca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:25Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:25Z
• dc.date.issued 1999-03-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:04:23Z
• dc.description.abstract In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=366
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/941
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 366
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword organized crime
• dc.subject.keyword punishment
• dc.subject.keyword plea-bargaining
• dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organization
• dc.title Optimal law enforcement and criminal organizationca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper