Ownership diversification and product market pricing Incentives
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- dc.contributor.author Banal-Estañol, Albert
- dc.contributor.author Seldeslachts, Jo
- dc.contributor.author Vives, Xavier
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2024-11-14T10:09:38Z
- dc.date.available 2024-11-14T10:09:38Z
- dc.date.issued 2022-11-01
- dc.date.modified 2024-11-14T10:08:45Z
- dc.description.abstract We link investor ownership to profit loads on rival firms by the managers of a firm. We propose a theory model in which we distinguish between passive and active investors' holdings, where passive investors are relatively more diversified. We find that if passive investors become relatively bigger, then common ownership incentives increase. We show that these higher incentives, in turn, are linked to higher firm markups. We empirically confirm these relationships for public US firms in the years 2004-2012, where the financial crisis coincides with passive investors' rise. The found effects are small but non-negligible.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1848
- dc.identifier.citation
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/68567
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1848
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword
- dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organization
- dc.title Ownership diversification and product market pricing Incentives
- dc.title.alternative
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper