Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

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• dc.contributor.author Garoupa, Nunoca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:19Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:19Z
• dc.date.issued 2000-11-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:05:58Z
• dc.description.abstract Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=529
• dc.identifier.citation Managerial and Decision Economics, 21, 6, (2000), pp.243-252
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/725
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 529
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword law enforcement
• dc.subject.keyword corporation
• dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organization
• dc.title Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspectiveca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper