On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

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• dc.contributor.author Hauk, Estherca
• dc.contributor.author Hurkens, Sjaakca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:26Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:26Z
• dc.date.issued 1999-07-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:04:46Z
• dc.description.abstract We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion of forward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the class of generic two player normal form games preceded by an outside option. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts (including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=408
• dc.identifier.citation Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 106, Number 1, September 2002, pp. 66-90(25)
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/737
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 408
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword forward induction
• dc.subject.keyword strategic stability
• dc.subject.keyword ees sets
• dc.subject.keyword index theory
• dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
• dc.title On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stabilityca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper