On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

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dc.contributor.authorHauk, Estherca
dc.contributor.authorHurkens, Sjaakca
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-26T10:50:26Z
dc.date.available2017-07-26T10:50:26Z
dc.date.issued1999-07-01
dc.date.modified2017-07-23T02:04:46Z
dc.description.abstractWe analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion of forward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the class of generic two player normal form games preceded by an outside option. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts (including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfca
dc.identifierhttps://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=408
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Theory, Volume 106, Number 1, September 2002, pp. 66-90(25)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10230/737
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics and Business Working Papers Series; 408
dc.rightsL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.keywordforward induction
dc.subject.keywordstrategic stability
dc.subject.keywordees sets
dc.subject.keywordindex theory
dc.subject.keywordMicroeconomics
dc.titleOn forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stabilityca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper

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