Research joint ventures in an international economy

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• dc.contributor.author Motta, Massimoca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:51:00Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:51:00Z
• dc.date.issued 1995-11-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:02:15Z
• dc.description.abstract D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to study alternative configurations of research agreements in a two--country integrated world economy. Under unambiguous conditions on spillovers we show that: 1) Allowing national firms to cooperate in R\&D confers them an advantage over foreign rivals, an effect similar to R\&D subsidies. 2) In a policy game, each government would allow national cooperative agreements. 3) Contrary to other trade policies which lead to a ``prisoners' dilemma'' result, welfare in both countries increases when they both allow R\&D cooperation. 4) Welfare is even higher if a generalized (international) coalition is formed.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=147
• dc.identifier.citation Ricerche Economiche, 50, (1996), pp. 293-315
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/20729
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 147
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
• dc.title Research joint ventures in an international economyca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper