On strategic transmission of gradually arriving information
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- dc.contributor.author Frug, Alexander
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2020-05-25T09:26:48Z
- dc.date.available 2020-05-25T09:26:48Z
- dc.date.issued 2019-12-24
- dc.date.modified 2020-05-25T09:26:02Z
- dc.description.abstract The main insight of the literature on strategic information transmission is that even a small conflict of interest between a fully informed sender (e.g., a financial adviser) and an uninformed receiver (an investor) often poses considerable difficulties for effective communication. However, in many real-life situations, the sender is not fully informed at the outset but gradually studies the case before offering advice. The gradual arrival of information to the sender weakens the strategic barriers between the players and significantly improves communication.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1691
- dc.identifier.citation
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44692
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1691
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword
- dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
- dc.title On strategic transmission of gradually arriving information
- dc.title.alternative
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper