The organization of public registries: A comparative analysis

Mostra el registre complet Registre parcial de l'ítem

  • dc.contributor.author Arruñada, Benito
  • dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
  • dc.date.accessioned 2024-11-14T10:09:52Z
  • dc.date.available 2024-11-14T10:09:52Z
  • dc.date.issued 2020-02-01
  • dc.date.modified 2024-11-14T10:06:43Z
  • dc.description.abstract This work analyzes the main tradeoffs in the organization of public registries, comparing five forms of organization: (1) the bureaucracies or "discretionary expense centers" used to provide privately valuable services in the welfare state; (2) the internal markets introduced to reform them, and the hybrid solutions that have been used by the liberal state since the 19th century to provide such privately valuable services, including (3) revenue centers based on user fees; (4) franchised systems in which professional civil servants are paid from the profit of an office; and (5) the contemporary variant in which the Government contracts out the provision of the whole service to a private firm. This comparison suggests that hybrid forms allow market forces to play a more effective role in organizing public registries because they are limited to a few variables, which makes stronger incentives possible while, at the same time, reducing the need for extensive planning and supervisory staff.
  • dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
  • dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1695
  • dc.identifier.citation
  • dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44747
  • dc.language.iso eng
  • dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1695
  • dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
  • dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
  • dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
  • dc.subject.keyword internal markets
  • dc.subject.keyword competition
  • dc.subject.keyword bureaucracy
  • dc.subject.keyword registries
  • dc.subject.keyword welfare
  • dc.subject.keyword incentives
  • dc.subject.keyword user fees
  • dc.subject.keyword user choice
  • dc.subject.keyword privatization
  • dc.subject.keyword Business Economics and Industrial Organization
  • dc.title The organization of public registries: A comparative analysis
  • dc.title.alternative
  • dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper