When transparency fails: Financial incentives for local banking agents in Indonesia
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- dc.contributor.author Deserranno, Erika
- dc.contributor.author León-Ciliotta, Gianmarco
- dc.contributor.author Witoelar, Firman
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2024-11-14T10:09:30Z
- dc.date.available 2024-11-14T10:09:30Z
- dc.date.issued 2021-01-02
- dc.date.modified 2024-11-14T10:07:39Z
- dc.description.abstract We study the effect of raising the level and the transparency of financial incentives offered to local agents for acquiring clients of a new banking product on take-up. We find that paying agents higher incentives increases take-up, but only when the incentives are unknown to prospective clients. When disclosed, higher incentives instead have no effect on take-up, despite greater agent effort. This is explained by the financial incentives conveying a negative signal about the reliability and trustworthiness of the product and its providers to potential clients. In contexts with limited information about a new technology, financial incentives can thus affect technology adoption through both a supply-side effect (more agent effort) as well as a demand-side signaling effect (change in demand perceptions). Organizations designing incentive schemes should therefore pay close attention to both the level and the transparency of such incentives.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1766
- dc.identifier.citation
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/68540
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1766
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword financial incentives
- dc.subject.keyword pay transparency
- dc.subject.keyword technology adoption
- dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
- dc.title When transparency fails: Financial incentives for local banking agents in Indonesia
- dc.title.alternative
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper