Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown
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- dc.contributor.author Eliaz, Kfir
- dc.contributor.author Frug, Alexander
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2024-11-14T10:09:42Z
- dc.date.available 2024-11-14T10:09:42Z
- dc.date.issued 2020-12-13
- dc.date.modified 2024-11-14T10:07:30Z
- dc.description.abstract We introduce a new channel for breakdown of cheap talk communication between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. Our framework has the following novel feature: conditional on interacting, both parties agree on the optimal action in each state, but there are sender types with which the receiver prefers not to interact. We show that for a broad class of preferences, any interval equilibrium induces only finitely many actions in the support of the receiver's strategy. We also show that introducing a second stage with noisy signals on the sender type has a dramatic effect on the firststage communication.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1759
- dc.identifier.citation
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/68582
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1759
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword cheap talk
- dc.subject.keyword contagion
- dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
- dc.title Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown
- dc.title.alternative
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper