Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions
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- dc.contributor.author Decarolis, Francesco
- dc.contributor.author Goldmanis, Maris
- dc.contributor.author Penta, Antonio
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2020-05-25T09:27:03Z
- dc.date.available 2020-05-25T09:27:03Z
- dc.date.issued 2019-04-12
- dc.date.modified 2020-05-25T09:25:59Z
- dc.description.abstract The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of both the Generalized Second Price auction (GSP, used by Google and Microsoft-Bing and Yahoo!) and the of VCG mechanism (used by Facebook). We find that, despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP auction both in terms of revenues and efficiency.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1657
- dc.identifier.citation
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44763
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1657
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword collusion
- dc.subject.keyword digital marketing agencies
- dc.subject.keyword facebook
- dc.subject.keyword google
- dc.subject.keyword gsp
- dc.subject.keyword internet auctions
- dc.subject.keyword online advertising
- dc.subject.keyword vcg
- dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
- dc.title Marketing agencies and collusive bidding in online ad auctions
- dc.title.alternative
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper