Monotone contracts
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- dc.contributor.author Bird, Daniel
- dc.contributor.author Frug, Alexander
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2020-05-25T09:26:58Z
- dc.date.available 2020-05-25T09:26:58Z
- dc.date.issued 2019-04-03
- dc.date.modified 2020-05-25T09:25:54Z
- dc.description.abstract A common feature of dynamic interactions is that the environment in which they occur typically changes, perhaps stochastically, over time. We consider a general uctuating contracting environment with symmetric information, and identify a systematic eect of the uctuations in the environment on optimal contracts. We develop a notion of a separable activity that corresponds to a large class of contractual components, and provide a tight condition under which these components manifest a form of seniority: any change that occurs in these components over time, under an optimal contract, favors the agent. We illustrate how our results can be applied in various economic settings.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1647
- dc.identifier.citation
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44736
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1647
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword dynamic contracting
- dc.subject.keyword stochastic opportunities.
- dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
- dc.title Monotone contracts
- dc.title.alternative
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper