Implementation via transfers with identical but unknown distributions
Mostra el registre complet Registre parcial de l'ítem
- dc.contributor.author Ollár, Mariann
- dc.contributor.author Penta, Antonio
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2020-05-25T09:27:05Z
- dc.date.available 2020-05-25T09:27:05Z
- dc.date.issued 2019-11-06
- dc.date.modified 2020-05-25T09:26:08Z
- dc.description.abstract We consider mechanism design environments in which agents commonly know that types are identically distributed across agents, but without assuming that the actual distribution is common knowledge, nor that it is known to the designer (common knowledge of identicality). Under these assumptions, we explore problems of partial and full implementation, as well as robustness. First, we characterize the transfers which are incentive compatible under the assumption of common knowledge of identicality, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for partial implementation. Second, we characterize the conditions under which full implementation is possible via direct mechanisms, as well as the transfer schemes which achieve full implementation whenever it is possible. Finally, we study the robustness properties of the implementing transfers with respect to misspecifications of agents preferences and with respect to lower orders beliefs in rationality.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1676
- dc.identifier.citation
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44769
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1676
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword moment conditions
- dc.subject.keyword robust full implementation
- dc.subject.keyword rationalizability
- dc.subject.keyword interdependent values
- dc.subject.keyword identical but unknown distributions
- dc.subject.keyword uniqueness
- dc.subject.keyword strategic externalities
- dc.subject.keyword canonical transfers
- dc.subject.keyword loading transfe
- dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
- dc.title Implementation via transfers with identical but unknown distributions
- dc.title.alternative
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper