Endogenous price leadership

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• dc.contributor.author van Damme, Ericca
• dc.contributor.author Hurkens, Sjaakca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T12:07:55Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T12:07:55Z
• dc.date.issued 2001-11-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:06:29Z
• dc.description.abstract We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with di®erentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose to wait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=581
• dc.identifier.citation Games and Economic Behavior 47, 404-20, 2004
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/500
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 581
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword price leadership
• dc.subject.keyword endogenous timing
• dc.subject.keyword risk dominance
• dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
• dc.title Endogenous price leadershipca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper