Equilibrium unemployment insurance
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- dc.contributor.author Hassler, Johnca
- dc.contributor.author Rodríguez Mora, José V.ca
- dc.contributor.author Storesletten, Kjetilca
- dc.contributor.author Zilibotti, Fabrizioca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:20Z
- dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:20Z
- dc.date.issued 1998-04-01
- dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:06:45Z
- dc.description.abstract In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insurance into a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictions and on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populated by identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distribution of human capital across agents, may choose very different unemployment insurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interaction between the political decision about the level of the unemployment insurance and the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism whichmay generate multiple steady-state equilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with high unemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist with an American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnover and low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model features two distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and duration rates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=605
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/844
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 605
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword comparative advantege
- dc.subject.keyword employment
- dc.subject.keyword political equilibrium
- dc.subject.keyword search
- dc.subject.keyword specialization
- dc.subject.keyword unemployment insurance
- dc.subject.keyword Macroeconomics and International Economics
- dc.title Equilibrium unemployment insuranceca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper