On the role of retaliation in trade agreements
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- dc.contributor.author Martin, Alberto, 1974-ca
- dc.contributor.author Vergote, Wouterca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:22Z
- dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:22Z
- dc.date.issued 2005-06-01
- dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:10:06Z
- dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presence of private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such agreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is a necessary feature of any efficient equilibrium. We argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to international transfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities. Within the current world trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidies are prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might be optimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the last decades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=914
- dc.identifier.citation Journal of International Economics, 76 (1) 2008, 61-77
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/20785
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 914
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword tariffs
- dc.subject.keyword retaliation
- dc.subject.keyword asymmetric information
- dc.subject.keyword wto
- dc.subject.keyword antidumping duties
- dc.subject.keyword Macroeconomics and International Economics
- dc.title On the role of retaliation in trade agreementsca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper