Price increase and stability with new entries in Cournot markets
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- dc.contributor.author Villanova, Ramonca
- dc.contributor.author Paradís, Jaumeca
- dc.contributor.author Viader Canals, Pelegríca
- dc.contributor.author Miralles, Joanca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:18Z
- dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:18Z
- dc.date.issued 2002-10-01
- dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:07:14Z
- dc.description.abstract It is widely accepted in the literature about the classical Cournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked, in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stable unique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolists as industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instability is proved false.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=646
- dc.identifier.citation Keio Economic Studies, 48, 69-96, 2012
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/477
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 646
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword cournot equilibrium
- dc.subject.keyword non-cooperative oligopoly
- dc.subject.keyword quasi-competitiveness
- dc.subject.keyword stability
- dc.subject.keyword Statistics, Econometrics and Quantitative Methods
- dc.title Price increase and stability with new entries in Cournot marketsca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper