Overconfidence and market efficiency with heterogeneous agents

Garcia, Diego; Sangiorgi, Francesco; Urosevic, Branko

Overconfidence and market efficiency with heterogeneous agents

License

Citation

Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pp. 313-336, February, 2007

Abstract

We study financial markets in which both rational and overconfident agents coexist and make endogenous information acquisition decisions. We demonstrate the following irrelevance result: when a positive fraction of rational agents (endogeneously) decides to become informed in equilibrium, prices are set as if all investors were rational, and as a consequence the overconfidence bias does not aect informational efficiency, price volatility, rational traders expected profits or their welfare. Intuitively, as overconfidence goes up, so does price infornativeness, which makes rational agents cut their information acquisition activities, effectively undoing the standard effect of more aggressive trading by the overconfident.