Endogenous Stackelberg leadership

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dc.contributor.authorvan Damme, Ericca
dc.contributor.authorHurkens, Sjaakca
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-26T10:50:58Z
dc.date.available2017-07-26T10:50:58Z
dc.date.issued1996-11-01
dc.date.modified2017-07-23T02:02:46Z
dc.description.abstractWe consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyze which of the players will commit when both players have the possibility to do so. To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player can either commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2. We show that committing is more risky for the high cost firm and that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous Stackelberg leader.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfca
dc.identifierhttps://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=190
dc.identifier.citationGames and Economic Behavior, 28, 1, (1999), pp. 105-129
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10230/713
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics and Business Working Papers Series; 190
dc.rightsL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.keywordduopoly
dc.subject.keywordstackelberg
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium selection
dc.subject.keywordMicroeconomics
dc.titleEndogenous Stackelberg leadershipca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper

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