Endogenous Stackelberg leadership

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• dc.contributor.author van Damme, Ericca
• dc.contributor.author Hurkens, Sjaakca
• dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
• dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:58Z
• dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:58Z
• dc.date.issued 1996-11-01
• dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:02:46Z
• dc.description.abstract We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyze which of the players will commit when both players have the possibility to do so. To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player can either commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2. We show that committing is more risky for the high cost firm and that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous Stackelberg leader.
• dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
• dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=190
• dc.identifier.citation Games and Economic Behavior, 28, 1, (1999), pp. 105-129
• dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/713
• dc.language.iso eng
• dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 190
• dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
• dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
• dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
• dc.subject.keyword duopoly
• dc.subject.keyword stackelberg
• dc.subject.keyword equilibrium selection
• dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
• dc.title Endogenous Stackelberg leadershipca
• dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper