Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil
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- dc.contributor.author Litschig, Stephanca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresaca
- dc.date.issued 2008-08-01ca
- dc.date.modified 2016-09-29T02:50:34Zca
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1144ca
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/4583ca
- dc.language.iso engca
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1144ca
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commonsca
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ca
- dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economicsca
- dc.subject.keyword bureaucracyca
- dc.subject.keyword institutionsca
- dc.subject.keyword redistributive politicsca
- dc.subject.keyword electoral competitionca
- dc.title Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazilca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca