Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?
Mostra el registre complet Registre parcial de l'ítem
- dc.contributor.author Iriberri, Nagoreca
- dc.contributor.author Rey-Biel, Pedroca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:10Z
- dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:10Z
- dc.date.issued 2008-04-01
- dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:12:22Z
- dc.description.abstract We use subjects actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification of individuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfare maximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects actions in the same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in others actions is known by subjects. We find that subjects with different interdependent preferences in fact have different beliefs about others actions. In particular, Selfish individuals cannot conceive others being non-Selfish while Social Welfare maximizers are closest to the actual distribution of others actions. We finally provide subjects with information on other subjects actions and re-classify individuals according to their (new) actions in the same modified dictator games. We find that social information does not affect Selfish individuals, but that individuals with interdependent preferences are more likely to change their behavior and tend to behave more selfishly.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1137
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/4584
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1137
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword interdependent preferences
- dc.subject.keyword social welfare maximizing
- dc.subject.keyword inequity aversion
- dc.subject.keyword belief elicitation
- dc.subject.keyword social information
- dc.subject.keyword experiments
- dc.subject.keyword mixture-of-types models
- dc.subject.keyword leex
- dc.subject.keyword Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
- dc.title Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?ca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper