Can sanctions induce pessimism? An experiment
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- dc.contributor.author Galbiati, Robertoca
- dc.contributor.author Schlag, Karlca
- dc.contributor.author van der Weele, Joëlca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:16Z
- dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:16Z
- dc.date.issued 2009-03-01
- dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:12:28Z
- dc.description.abstract We run an experiment in which two subjects play a two-round minimum effort game in the presence of a third player (principal) who is the only one informed about past effort choices and benefits from a higher minimum effort of the others. Sanctions introduced in the second round by the experimenter lead to more optimistic beliefs and higher efforts. This is not true when sanctions have been imposed by the principal. The possibility that the choice of a sanction is a signal of low effort levels causes players who chose high effort in the first round to be less optimistic.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1150
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/4791
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1150
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword sanctions
- dc.subject.keyword beliefs
- dc.subject.keyword expressive law
- dc.subject.keyword deterrence
- dc.subject.keyword coordination
- dc.subject.keyword minimum effort game
- dc.subject.keyword leex
- dc.subject.keyword Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- dc.title Can sanctions induce pessimism? An experimentca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper