Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

dc.contributor.authorHauk, Estherca
dc.contributor.authorNagel, Rosemarieca
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-26T12:07:55Z
dc.date.available2017-07-26T12:07:55Z
dc.date.issued2000-07-01
dc.date.modified2017-07-23T02:05:29Z
dc.description.abstractWe examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intending defectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfca
dc.identifierhttps://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=487
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Conflict Resolution, 45, 6, (2001), pp. 770-793
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10230/410
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics and Business Working Papers Series; 487
dc.rightsL'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.keywordprisoner's dilemma
dc.subject.keywordpartner selection
dc.subject.keywordexperiments
dc.subject.keywordmultiple games
dc.subject.keywordleex
dc.subject.keywordBehavioral and Experimental Economics
dc.titleChoice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental studyca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper

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