Optimal contracts with randomly arriving tasks
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- dc.contributor.author Bird, Daniel
- dc.contributor.author Frug, Alexander
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2020-05-25T09:27:03Z
- dc.date.available 2020-05-25T09:27:03Z
- dc.date.issued 2020-01-20
- dc.date.modified 2020-05-25T09:26:02Z
- dc.description.abstract Workers rarely perform exactly the same tasks every day. Instead, their daily workload may change randomly over time to comply with the uctuating needs of the organiza- tion where they are employed. In this paper, we show that this typical randomness in workplaces has a striking eect on the structure of long-term employment contracts. In particular, simple intertemporal variability in the worker's tasks is sucient to gen- erate a rich promotion-based dynamics in which, occasionally, the worker receives a (permanent) wage raise and his future work requirements are reduced.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdf*
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=1690
- dc.identifier.citation
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/44762
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1690
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword dynamic contracting
- dc.subject.keyword random tasks
- dc.subject.keyword seniority
- dc.subject.keyword promotion.
- dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
- dc.title Optimal contracts with randomly arriving tasks
- dc.title.alternative
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper