Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation
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- dc.contributor.author Aragonés, Enriquetaca
- dc.contributor.author Postlewaite, Andrewca
- dc.contributor.other Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
- dc.date.accessioned 2017-07-26T10:50:45Z
- dc.date.available 2017-07-26T10:50:45Z
- dc.date.issued 2000-09-01
- dc.date.modified 2017-07-23T02:05:56Z
- dc.description.abstract We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaign rhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over what policy the candidate will implement in case he wins the election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological. Voter's strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates that renege of their campaign promises, and in equilibrium all campaign promises are believed by voters, and honored by candidates. We obtain that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate's reputation.
- dc.format.mimetype application/pdfca
- dc.identifier https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=525
- dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10230/570
- dc.language.iso eng
- dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 525
- dc.rights L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
- dc.rights.accessRights info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
- dc.subject.keyword electoral campaigns
- dc.subject.keyword reputation
- dc.subject.keyword commitment
- dc.subject.keyword Microeconomics
- dc.title Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputationca
- dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper